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AI team research / PRAXENOR PERSPECTIVES

Teamwork or coordinated misuse?

AI agents are meant to share work. The useful question is whether they stayed within the task and permissions you approved.

Cooperation is expected

Teams of agents are often built to divide work, share results, and follow the same plan. Similar timing or repeated contact with the same system may be ordinary cooperation. Treating every coordinated pattern as an attack would make a detector difficult to use.

The question is more specific: does the recorded activity fit the approved task and each agent’s permissions?

Follow the requests across the team

In a fictional task, one agent is refused access to a restricted export. Another agent then requests related material through a different tool. That sequence could be an attempt to cross a boundary, or it could be an approved way of sharing the work. The task context and permissions matter.

Praxenor’s research asks whether reviewing a team’s allowed and blocked attempts together can reveal activity worth investigating. A pattern may suggest that agents are working together; it does not prove that they are secretly planning an attack.

OWASP’s AI Agent Security guidance recommends boundaries between agents, checks on their messages and controls against gaining extra permission through a chain of agents. These controls provide context for investigation; a tool that flags patterns does not replace them.

Related government research: UK AISI’s simulation involving multiple agents found that dividing an attack across agents could make monitoring each agent separately less effective. That finding motivates broader evaluation; it does not validate our detector.

Test ordinary teamwork as carefully as attacks

Tests should include ordinary teamwork, agents retrying together after an outage, unrelated mistakes and agents deliberately breaking rules together. Use different scenarios for testing and for adjusting the detector.

Report missed cases as well as false alarms. Describe which actions were visible, how events were linked, and what happened when records were missing. A result from a small simulation cannot establish how the system will perform with different tools, workloads, or attackers.

Activity missing from the records may go unseen. An empty alert list is not proof that agents did not work together.

An alert needs a separate response decision

Our proposed monitoring tool supplies records for review. It cannot disconnect agents or remove their permissions on its own; a person must approve those responses. Existing permission checks can still refuse an unauthorized action when it is attempted.

A reviewer can question the alert’s explanation and consider what disconnecting an agent would interrupt. Waiting for that review can delay stopping the activity.

The work is still a research prototype being tested under controlled conditions. Our aim is to make a concerning pattern understandable enough to investigate, and to measure when the detector is wrong.

See why blocked actions still matter. For implementation questions, read technical details and check current product status.

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